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with them.THE FUTURE OF ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES
- A View from Europe -
1. The Challenges of the 1990s
Major disturbances in their global environment such as the
world-wide recession in the early 1980s, in increasing protectionism
in the EC and the US, large exchange rate fluctuations, high and
volatile real interest rates and commodity price shocks have not
prevented developing Asian countries from accelerating economic and
social progress in the 1980s. Real per capital income grew much fas-
ter than in the 1970s both in South and East Asia, and the income
gap between the Asia Pacific region and industrialised countries
narrowed substantially (Table 1). Projections of e.g. the World Bank
[1990] and the Nomura Research Institute [Kwan, 1990] indicate that
these favourable trends are likely to be sustainable throughout the
1990s. Estimates of per capita income growth range from 5 to 7 per
cent for East and Southeast Asia and around 3 per cent for South
Asia. The good prospects for the coming decade are, nonetheless,
overshadowed by rising uncertainties and concerns about persistent
and severe trade imbalances, the emergence of trading blocs and the
future destiny of the former socialist economies. With respect to
Europe, fears are that
- the EC may cause a failure of the Uruguay Round, thus paving the
way towards more bilateralism and regionalism in world trade;
- the EC may be tempted to facilitate structural adjustment required
for the Single European Market by reducing competition from non-
member countries (fortress Europe);
- special EC trade preferences for Eastern Europe and a diversion of
private as well as official capital flows from the South to the
East may erode the competitive position of suppliers from Asia on
European markets.
*
Paper prepared for the Conference on "The Future of Asia-Pacific
Economies (FAPE IV)", 11-13 March 1991 in New Delhi.Table 1: Growth of Real Per Capita Income, 1965-2000 (in per cent
per year)
Region Average annual rate of growth
1965-1980 1980-1989 1989-2000
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East and Southeast Asia
South Asia
Projections. -, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. -
°Estimates. - Including the Caribbean. -
 eIncluding North
Africa and European developing countries.




















Such concerns can certainly not be dismissed easily. However,
dynamic impulses for structural adjustment and economic growth in
Europe embodied in the European integration and a market-orientation
of Eastern Europe could easily offset the detrimental effects of old
and new protectionism. The purpose of this paper is to develop a
scenario of likely economic and economic policy changes in Europe in
the 1990s and to assess the risks as well as the chances that may
emerge for Asia-Pacific economies. The analysis focuses on the EC in
the Uruguay Round (Section 2), the impact of the European integra-
tion envisaged for 1993 on market access for developing Asian coun-
tries (Section 3) and the consequences of economic reconstruction in
Eastern Europe (Section 4). Some conclusions are provided in Sec-
tion 5.2. EC Trade Policies and the Uruguay Round
2.1 The EC as a trading partner of Asia-Pacific
The integration into the international division of labour in
manufactures was a driving force behind the favourable economic per-
formance of Asia-Pacific economies in the 1980s. This is reflected
in the growing importance of manufactures and in particular capital
goods in their export basket. In 1988, about 44 per cent of all
developing countries' exports originated from the Asia-Pacific re-
gion [World Bank, 1990, Table 14], and Asian NIEs and Near NIEs
participated overproportionately in the expansion of highly income
elastic inter-industry trade with capital goods [GATT, 1989, Table
4].
In trade with OECD countries the Asia-Pacific region accounted
for roughly 11 per cent of total imports and a bit over 9 per cent
of total exports at the end of the 1980s (Tables Al and A2) while
tfyese shares were only 5.6 and about 4 per cent in the case of the
EC. Abstracting from intra-EC trade, EC imports from the region
amounted to 13.7 per cent of all imports from non-member countries,
still much lower than the 19.2 per cent achieved in the US or the
29.7 per cent in Japan. Nonetheless, the EC remained the second most
important export market behind the US for Asia-Pacific in terms of
volume and the most important market for South Asia (Table 2). The
change of the geographical distribution of exports in the 1980s
mirrors exchange rate realignments. Since 1985/86 the US market lost
attractiveness in favour of exports to the EC and Japan. However, in
1989, EC markets had an average not regained the importance as an
export destination they had in 1980. In light of the continued
strength of the European currencies this may only be a matter of
time, but the future trade policy stance of the EC could also have a
significant impact on import absorption.
A brief review of EC trade policies towards developing coun-
tries (DCs) shows a mixed score [Hiemenz et al., 1991]. Concerning
manufactures, EC markets have remained relatively open for DCs as


















































































































































































NOTE: Manufactures = SITC 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 without 67 + 68; EC-12 = Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK;
EFTA = Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; CMEA = USSR, GDR, Poland, CSFR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.
Source: Table Al.the diversity of institutional arrangements they were not as easily
accessible as US markets, though, and the share of DCs in total
domestic supply has on average remained small (below 3 per cent in
1985/86). The generally favourable picture of EC trade relations
with DCs is, however, clouded by a large number of trade impediments
applied by the EC and its member countries against imports of speci-
fic products and from specific countries causing considerable wel-
fare losses to EC consumers and suppliers from DCs. EC trade poli-
cies are characterised by a dichotomy between the commitment to
liberal (GATT) trade rules and the desire to shield domestic prod-
ucers against "too much" foreign competition (already embodied in
the 1957 Treaty of Rome).
The result was an increasingly complex trade policy regime
wh.ich is very selective on a product-by-product basis, extremely
discriminatory among countries, and has become more and more so-
phisticated and, therefore, less transparent over time. Several
trends were observed. In response to multilateral trade negotiations
EC trade protectionism has shifted from tariff to non-tariff bar-
riers under the jurisdiction of individual member governments, and
within the range of NTBs from quantitative restrictions to measures
partly outside of GATT rules such as VERs, surveillance and anti-
dumping procedures. Most of these trade policy instruments have
predominantly been implemented against imports from other indus-
trialised countries, but their use against competitive suppliers
from both more and less advanced DCs particularly in Asia has been
increasing in recent years.
Compared to these trade restrictions, trade preferences granted
to DCs were limited, discriminatingly applied, and of questionable
value for eligible countries [Blokker, Faber and Hellingman, 1990].
Separate preference schemes have been implemented for ACP, Mediter-
ranean and other DCs, with preference margins declining in that
order. In a nutshell, all preference agreements have provided low or
even zero margins for important export products of DCs such as agri-
cultural products or have limited the eligibility to narrow tariff
quotas in the case of competitive suppliers such as the Asian NIEsand near-NIEs. Preferences were plentiful for countries such as
those from the ACP region which cannot supply manufactured exports
at a significant scale because of domestic policy distortions. For
these reasons, trade effects of the GSP and the other related agree-
ments have remained negligible as unused preferences and/or imports
in excess of tariff quotas amply demonstrate [Hiemenz et al., 1991,
Chapter IV].
In sum, there seems to have been an increase in the overall
level of protectionism applied against DCs in the 1980s. This new
wave of protectionism did, however, not hurt all DCs alike. Import
barriers focused on NIEs in general and specifically on Asian NIEs,
but also on some second-generation exporters from the Asia-Pacific
region when they emerged as competitive suppliers of certain prod-
ucts on EC markets. Rising EC import market shares (Table Al) are
proves, though, that product-specific protectionism has not been
able to slow export expansion of Asia-Pacific economies to the EC in
a significant manner. They indicate the continued openness of EC
markets for most manufactures for suppliers from non-member coun-
tries, including those from the Asia-Pacific region.
2.2 The EC and the Uruguay Round
Prospects for future access to the EC hinge on the outcome of
the Uruguay Round and on the shape of trade policies implemented
after 1992. Concerning the Uruguay Round, all available information
seems to suggest that the EC will neither deviate much from its pro-
tectionist stance in agriculture nor give up the principle of spe-
cial treatment and selectivity. Until now, negotiating parties were
not able to reach agreement in any of the more important disputes.
The EC would like to postpone the elimination of subsidies to agri-
culture as long as possible while developing countries oppose a
liberalisation of trade in services to protect their own infant
service industries. Since the US have maintained the political pres-
sure in favour of trade liberalisation and no party involved can
in my judgement - risk a complete failure of the negotiations, last
minute compromises are the likely outcome. Agreement may be reachedwith respect to a stepwise, medium-term reduction of trade barriers
and subsidies for agriculture, a partial liberalisation of trade in
services at least among industrialised countries - in line with
creation of a Single European Market - and a gradual return of trade
in textiles under the folds of the GATT Treaty. Special treatment of
DCs will be continued but NIEs are likely to be graduated from pre-
ferential treatment.
Such a scenario of the emerging world trading order for the
1990s would comprise risks for DCs in the short term and new chances
in the medium term. More liberal trade in agricultural products
would lead to higher world market prices for almost all important
food items since these prices are artificially depressed because of
the agricultural protectionism of all industrialised countries and
export dumping by the EC. Higher world market prices will benefit
large agricultural exporters like Argentina, Australia or Brazil,
but inflict a new burden on the balance of payment of food importing
countries, e.g. in South Asia.
Concerning trade in textiles and services, those countries
stand to gain in principle from a gradual liberalisation which al-
ready are established suppliers of these goods such as the East
Asian NIEs and the Near NIEs of the ASEAN group as well as India
which held the second rank as an exporter of textiles to the EC and
the seventh rank concerning MFA clothing (1987). These countries
have been hit hardest by the protectionism built into the MFA. They
were also able to successfully compete in world markets for trans-
port as well as marketing and engineering services. It must be ex-
pected, though, that access to EC markets (and markets of industri-
alised countries in general) will only improve marginally for the
more successful countries which have fully used their quotas. Their
MFA quotas are likely to remain close to what they were before, and
access to services' markets are likely to be made subject to reci-
procity agreements. This should - in turn - improve the locational
advantages of newcomers which have not yet exhausted their quotas.
They stand to benefit overproportionately from further liberalisa-
tion and should be able to attract new investors both domesticallyand from abroad. Concerning MFA products, the prospects of these
countries could be further improved by the dismantling of market
disruption clauses in the context of the European integration. The
arbitrary invocation of these clauses has all too often discouraged
newcomers in the past and created a substantial degree of uncertain-
ty for potential investors. This subject will be elaborated further
in Section 3.2 below.
Summarising it seems safe to conclude that the Uruguay Round
will hardly produce breathtaking improvements of market access to
the EC for Asia-Pacific economies. From the viewpoint of December
1990, the best the Uruguay Round could produce is to secure the
stability of an open international trading environment and to pre-
vent trade wars.
3. The 1992-Project of the EC
3.1 Chances and risks
Concerning 1992, the bright prospects offered by a prosperous
single EC market are dimmed by the fear that economic integration
among the core members together with the accession of the new mem-
bers Spain and Portugal may only be accomplished at the expense of
restricting access for non-members, i.e. by erecting a "Fortress
Europe". In addition, there are concerns that the Single Market may
change the investment behaviour of EC and non-EC firms to the detri-
ment of Asian economies.
Despite substantial differences in protection levels among EC
member countries [Hiemenz et al., 1991, Chapter II], all major deci-
sion with regard to trade policy matters are still pending. Having
accomplished a free trade area and a customs union, the 1992 project
means the establishment a common market without internal borders and
border controls. To achieve this, EC member countries have to lib-
eralise factor movement and trade in services within the EC. Con-
cerning manufactures, trade has already been liberalised except for
a relatively small member of products (including those covered bythe MFA) for which national quotas are still existing. Such quotas
will have to be removed. Furthermore, market access will be based on
the country-of-origin principle but certain technical norms and
standards as well as VAT treatment are going to be harmonised within
the EC. It is not clear, though, how and when these policy changes
will be implemented and how suppliers from third countries may fit
into the new framework [for details, see Dicke/Langhammer, 1990].
Alternative integration scenarios [e.g. Langhammer, 1990] sug-
gest a number of risks for non-member countries but also consider-
able chances for enhanced trade expansion:
- The dismantling of all barriers against the free movement of goods
and factors of production within the EC will accelerate structural
change and economic growth. Estimates are that an additional GDP
growth of 1 percentage point per annum is feasible well into the
1990s. Assuming roughly constant income elasticities of import
demand the resulting additional import demand would by far exceed
trade diversion due to a once and for all shift between domestic
and import prices.
- Increased import demand will primarily benefit competitive sup-
pliers of manufactures and services from developing countries. Raw
material saving technical progress and environmental conservation
technologies are likely to de-link import demand for commodities
further from economic growth to the detriment of commodity export-
ing countries.
- Concerning trade policy, the dismantling of often redundant na-
tional import quotas is in progress and will continue. However,
there is a core of national quotas, e.g. for cars, iron and steel,
textiles and clothing, and agricultural products, that are effec-
tive under the safeguard provision of Art. 115, EEC Treaty. In all
theses cases, national quotas are likely to be replaced by a com-
mon EC quota roughly equivalent to the sum of national quotas.
- Preferences for imports from developing countries will be main-
tained after 1992 although they have proven to be ineffective as a
means of trade creation [Langhammer, Sapir, 1987]. East Asian NIEs
may, however, be graduated from the GSP as was mentioned above (p.
8) .10
- The new EC member countries, Spain and Portugal, possess a factor
endowment similar to many DCs. In a single market, these factor
endowments could create incentives for trade diversion and a shift
of EC investment to the EC periphery. This tendency is reinforced
through the subsidisation of capital provided by the 'Regional
Fund
1 of the EC Commission.
- Investors from non-member countries have found the EC increasingly
attractive (Table 3 below). The single market may further stimu-
late capital inflows, and the opening up of Eastern Europe is
likely to provide additional incentives for foreign investors in
the EC. Massive capital inflows will, however, result in an appre-
ciation of the European currencies, thus improving the relative
competitive position of DCs.
3.2 Impact on Asia-Pacific economies
The general implications of the 1992 project on the Asian re-
gion can be sketched in a clear-cut way. The envisaged trade policy
changes do not discriminate among non-member countries, and hence,
the supply potential of exporting countries will determine the bene-
fits they can reap from a prosperous EC market. The income effects
of accelerated structural change favour suppliers of manufactures
and services over commodity exporters. Since the Asian economies are
potent suppliers of manufactures and certain services they will face
expanding markets for their exports. Under the assumption of 1 per
cent additional growth in the EC after 1992, real manufactured im-
ports would rise by additional 5.5 per cent annually [Hiemenz et
al. , 1991, p. 419] while trade diversion would account for no more
than one fifth of increased import demand.
The competition from countries of the EC periphery such as
Spain and Portugal can hardly change this generally favourable pros-
pect. Competition for risk capital within the EC between the core
regions and the periphery will be enhanced, and the initial inflow
of capital into the periphery will lead to rising prices for non-
tradeables relative to tradeables (real appreciation) in these coun-11







































































NOTE: A = Total exports of goods for which preferences can be
claimed.
B = Share of goods actually receiving preferences.
Source: EUROSTAT, Microfiche Statistics, Microfiche Set No. SPG-
2441 (1978), Luxembourg. - EUROSTAT, Au(3enhandel, Allge-
meines Praferenzsystem (APS), Serie C (1988), Luxembourg.
tries. Labour costs would rise and the participation of the peri-
phery countries in the European Monetary System (EMS) would deny
them the option to fight rising labour costs by exchange rate ad-
justments. This process could be enhanced by political pressure
towards "social harmonisation" within the EC-12 so that differences
in labour costs between the centre and the periphery would be level-
ed further. Under this scenario, relatively labour-intensive pro-
duction in the periphery would lose competitiveness and would be
shifted to countries outside the EC, i.e. Asian developing countries
and Eastern Europe.
The globalisation of both GSP and MFA quotas in a single market
will have much less of an effect on trading opportunities than some12
observers seem to expect [e.g. Report of the Ambassador's Committee,
1989, p. 12]. The argument was that a common quota would allow Asian
exporters to optimise quota utilisation. Concerning the GSP tariff
quotas, utilisation indeed differs substantially between EC member
countries as Table 3 shows for ASEAN countries. The same observation
applies to India. In 1987, the share of preference-receiving imports
in total EC imports of sensitive textiles from India ranged from 52
per cent in Germany to 26 per cent in the UK [EC microfiche statis-
tics SPG-2441, 30 November 1988, p. 835]. These data as well as
Table 3 show also, however, that quota utilisation was generally
low, below 40 per cent on average in the case of ASEAN countries,
while total imports were much larger than quota utilisation. This
indicates that ASEAN countries (and India) were competitive on EC
markets without receiving preferences. Obviously, the small size of
tariff quotas and the administrative costs of applying for quota
allocations have eroded the value of the GSP for both South and East
Asian exporters. The single market is not going to change this pic-
ture in any major way.
Concerning MFA quotas, a common EC quota resembling the sum of
present national quota would only increase import volumes if suppli-
ers do not or cannot exhaust the national quotas (e.g. because of a
restrictive national quota administration). This is not the case,
though. The important East Asian suppliers, in particular Hong Kong,
have perfected their systems of quota utilisation, e.g. by trading
unused quota among suppliers. A similar picture emerges for Indian
MFA exports to the EC. Data collected by the Indian Apparel Export
Promotion Council (AEPC) suggest that there was a steady increase of
utilisation rates since 1983 and all member state quotas - except
for the small Greek market - were fully exhausted by 1987 (Table 4).
Under these circumstances, the introduction of a common quotas would
not have any quantitative effect, and a future expansion of trade in
textiles and clothing entirely depends on progress in the Uruguay
Round (see above). There could, however, be an impact on prices.
Since domestic and import prices tend to be higher in more restric-
tive countries, a common quota would lower prices in these markets
but increase prices in less restrictive countries such as e.g. Ger-13
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All 73.2 76.4 79.8
NOTE: OBA = Outside Bilateral Agreement
Source: Kumar and Khanna, 1990, p. 195.
many. Depending on the size of the different markets, the common
quota may ultimately contribute to increasing export revenues. All
in all, this effect will, however, remain rather modest.
Concerning the liberalisation of services trade after 1992,
there is only skimpy information on the competitive strength of
Asian (and other) DCs as suppliers of services [Langhammer, 1989].
Tourism, passenger transport (aviation), as well as merchandise
transport emerge as those broad categories of services in which a
large number of Asian countries has improved their international
competitiveness.14
Concerning tourism, relative prices of tourist services inside
and outside the Community are expected to be influenced by two coun-
tervailing aspects of the EC single market. Internal prices will
fall because of intensified competition in the aviation market and
trans-border mergers of tourist agencies. On the other hand, inter-
nal prices may rise once and for all if a VAT of 6.5 per cent is
levied on intra-European travel and if a fuel tax is imposed on
intra-EC shipping. Finally, airport companies may try to raise their
fees in order to compensate for the loss in earnings from duty-free
shops which become redundant in the single market. The net effect of
both price movements is uncertain as changes in the real exchange
rates of the European tourist resort areas have to be taken into
account. With rising unit labour costs in the Mediterranean member
countries there is room for the (ceteris paribus) assumption that
the ratio between internal and extra-EC prices for tourist services
will increase thus providing chances for Asian countries to attract
tourists.
The aviation market is the one of considerable export interest
for low-cost carriers in Asia. The market is characterised by an ex-
tremely high degree of bilateralism, and though the Commission has
subjected aviation to the competition rules of the Rome Treaty,
there will be no common policy until 1992. Capacities have been
expanded because of lowered barriers to entry, but price competition
is still very much restricted because of the so-called group exemp-
tion in the competition articles through which pool arrangements are
sanctioned. As long as other member countries still have the right
to protect their national flag carriers (e.g. in France and in Ger-
many) , price competition will be confined to few routes within the
EC. The recent nationalisation of private carriers in France does
not support the optimistic view of enhanced competition between
newcomers and national flag carriers in the context of 1992 [Mathew,
1989].
Unlike the aviation market, the Commission has gained a mandate
in maritime transport to act against third country suppliers if they
are alleged of unfair pricing. In a case decided in early 1989 the15
Commission imposed for the first time a countervailing duty on an
external supplier of services, a South Korean shipping company ope-
rating a liner service between EC ports and Australia (Abl, 15/89, L
4 January 4, 1989). The company allegedly received subsidies and
thus underbid European companies which requested the "unfair pric-
ing" regulation to be imposed by the Commission. This regulation can
be regarded as the nucleus of a common policy in maritime transport
against third countries. A common policy is facilitated by the fact
that most EC shipping agencies already jointly act in liner con-
ferences and have established common institutions which lobby in
Brussels.
In banking and insurance, third countries are confronted with
the reciprocity clause in the so-called Second Banking Draft Direc-
tive. Banking licences which are necessary to provide services in
the single market are issued if EC banks and insurances do not noti-
fy discriminatory actions against their own business in the third
country. For the majority of Asian developing countries the reci-
procity clause will be ineffective since their banks have only
established funding offices or financing agencies for merchandise
trade in EC countries rather than branches offering full scale bank-
ing services.
Aside from trade, the 1992 project raises concern about a di-
version of investment flows. In this context, it must be noted that
FDI withdrew from developing countries in the 1980s and focussed on
industrialised countries. In 1989, only 10 out of US$ 147.5 billion
FDI flows went to developing countries [Alworth, Turner, 1990, Table
6]. Asia NIEs and Near NIEs proved to remain attractive for foreign
investors. Their share in FDI flows to developing countries in-
creased throughout the 1980s and amounted to roughly 50 per cent in
1988. As a share of total flows this was equivalent only to 5.5 per
cent (down from 6.6 per cent in 1980-1984) indicating the rather
limited interest of foreign investors even in the fast growing coun-
tries of this region.
A detailed break-down of FDI stocks by major home countries of
investors and host countries/regions (Table 5) shows that all16























































































Excluding oil companies, banks and insurance companies. - Sum of South Asia, ASEAN, PR China, NIEs.
Source: Die Kapitalverflechtung der Untemehmen mit dem Ausland nach Landern und Wirtschaftszweigen,
Beilage zu "Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank", Reihe 3,
Zahlungsbilanzstatistik, various issues. - Business Monitor, Census of overseas assets, Cen-
tral Statistical Office, a publication of the Government Statistical Service, various issues.
- US, Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, various issues. - Japan, Ministry
of Finance, Zaisei Kingu Tokei Geppo (Monetary and Financial Statistics Monthly), various
issues.
investors from within and from outside of the EC have enlarged their
EC engagement in the 1980s. Country data (not given in the Table)
suggest that Spain and Portugal were preferred locations for most
investors. The picture of Asia is mixed. The respective shares of US
and German FDI stocks increased while those of Japan and the UK
declined substantially. Within Asia, ASEAN countries were preferred17
by all investors over the NIEs; South Asia remained a marginal loca-
tion .
With respect to 1992, countervailing forces are at work. The
large common market together with the fear of new protectionist
measures will provide an incentive for FDI aiming at securing or
gaining shares in the EC market as was mentioned above. This incen-
tive will be strengthened by EC subsidies for investment in the
periphery. Rising labour costs and exchange rate appreciation may,
however, limit the attractiveness of the EC to investment in human
capital- und technology-intensive industries in which EC suppliers
primarily compete with those from other industrialised countries and
from Asian NIEs. For this reason, the NIEs will be well advised to
intensify their FDI engagement in the EC to secure their competitive
edge in the single market. Southeast and South Asia's attractiveness
must not suffer in this process if the countries can maintain or
improve (South Asia) their competitiveness in the division of labour
with the EC. The EC may, however, also became a preferred entry
point to the newly emerging markets in Eastern Europe including the
USSR. In addition to geographical proximity, some EC member coun-
tries, in particular Germany, have accumulated substantial knowledge
on how to operate in Eastern Europe which foreign investors may want
to exploit for their own purposes. For this reason, hypotheses about
the future direction of investment flows require an assessment of
the economic potential that is developing in Eastern European coun-
tries .
4. Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific Economies
4.1. Policy reform and foreseeable change of the economic land-
scape in Europe
The transition of Middle and Eastern European countries from
central planning and CMEA integration to market determined economic
management systems and an integration into the international divi-
sion of labour are in full swing, but a lack of reliable data and
even a lack of trustworthy information on the future course of re-18
form programmes make it extremely hazardous to assess the conse-
quences of these policy reforms for third countries. Facts are that
- CMEA economies (including the USSR) are dependant on foreign trade
in a similar way as Western market economies. They have, however,
continuously lost market shares in world trade because of their
distorted and aging structure of production (Tables Al, A2).
- foreign indebtedness of CMEA countries in convertible currencies
has already reached critical limits when measured by the debt
service ratio [OECD, 1990, pp. 47-52].
- CMEA partners have imported primary commodities and energy from
the USSR at prices below world market levels. The OECD [1990, p.'
49] estimates the implicit subsidy to have amounted to at least
US$ 5 billion annually.
This is the background against which the change of economic
systems in Middle and Eastern Europe has to be evaluated. The task
is enormous. Macroeconomic stabilisation including substantial ex-
change rate adjustments has to go hand in hand with the introduction
of flexible prices, the definition and legal formulation of property
rights, a dismantling of obsolete production structures, and the
creation of a costly social net to ease the burden of the transition
period on the population. Furthermore, CMEA trade will be valued in
convertible currencies from 1 January 1991. The EC has agreed to
grant preferential market access to her Eastern neighbours, and
Western donors [IMF, World Bank, the G-24 countries and the newly
established "European Bank for Reconstruction and Development"] seem
to be prepared to support the reform process with substantial
amounts of public funds.
What could all this mean for developing countries in general?
In my assessment, structural adjustment in CMEA countries cannot be
viewed as a menace for future development in the Third World for
several good reasons:
- Even if policy reforms are actually implemented according to sched-
ule, these are severe bottlenecks on the supply side of these19
economies which will prevent a rapid expansion of internationally
competitive exports for many years to come.
- Slow export growth will impede the financing of necessary imports
of primarily investment goods. Given the high indebtedness of CMEA
countries in hard currencies, financing from the private capital
market will hardly be available and, hence, the countries have to
hope for public funds and foreign direct investment.
- Even if public funds are generously granted and foreign investors
are attracted by the market,potential of Eastern Europe, there are
narrow limits to the absorptive capacity of CMEA countries. Physi-
cal infrastructure is in a disastrous condition; necessary insti-
tutions do not yet exist or have just been established; politi-
cians and administrators have no experience in handling large-
scale investment projects or adjustment programs; the environmen-
tal destruction is in an advanced stage; valuation of old debt and
present assets presents almost unsurmountable problems; markets
. for private property shares and securities do not yet function;
property rights still need to be cast in appropriate laws; and so
on and on.
This rather cautious appraisal of the development potential in
Middle and Eastern Europe suggest that developing countries need not
be afraid of an erosion of their trading opportunities, substantial
reductions of aid budgets or a seizable redirection of investment
flows. The main conclusion for the 1990s is, however, that locati-
onal competition for mobile factors of production such as physical
and human capital as well as competition on product markets will
intensify.
4.2. How Asia-Pacific economies may be effected
The above general conclusions have to be refined somewhat for
individual groups of Asia-Pacific economies. The most immediate
impact of the transition of Eastern Europe towards market economies
will be on South Asia. This region has been trading with the socia-
list countries of Europe rather intensively (Table 6) while this

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: UN, COK-7RADE Databank, special calculations.21
share of trade between South Asia and Eastern Europe was barter
trade. Therefore, South Asia will have to face a twofold challenge.
First, -import demand of former European socialist countries and the
USSR is breaking down as a result of economic transition and mis-
management. And secondly, the introduction of world market prices as
accounting unit for trade with former CMEA countries will erode
possibilities for barter trade and may shift competitive advantages
away from South Asian suppliers. These developments are likely to
force these suppliers to look for new markets in Western economies
and South Asian governments to remove policy induced obstacles to
exports in order to avoid a balance of payments crunch.
Payment problems could also become tougher for South Asia as a
result of enhanced competition for public funds. Limited access to
private capital markets and a mounting foreign indebtedness have
made the availability of foreign aid a crucial element for continued
poverty alleviation in many South Asian economies. Given the desas-
trous economic situation in Eastern Europe including the USSR, de-
mand for public funds will be increasing tremendously. Even if one
takes various political statements of EC and European government
officials for granted that the needs of Eastern Europe will not be
met at the expense of developing countries, there seems to be hardly
room for major increments of develoment aid budgets in Western
Europe which have accounted for roughly 45 per cent of total ODA
from DAC countries in 1987/88 [OECD, 1989, Table 3]. South Asia has
been among the major recipients of ODA from Germany, a country,
which is additionally burdened by the costs associated with the
reunification. And finally, there is a strong commitment of all DAC
countries to support development in Sub-Sahara Africa that has nega-
tively effected aid flows to South Asia already in the 1980s (Table
7). All in all, it seems to be reasonable for policy makers in South
Asia to envisage declining aid flows in real terms from Western
Europe. A matching increase of aid from other DAC donors does not
appear to be likely since the US and Japan will also become engaged
in economic reconstruction, of Eastern Europe and, in particular, the
USSR. In addition, progress towards peace in Indochina and the open-
ing up of Vietnam will also cause the redirection of some aid flows
within the Asia-Pacific region.22
Table 7: Share of Developing Regions in Total ODA Flows, 1980/81 and

















Defined as in Table 1
and Sri Lanka.
- Includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
Source: OECD, 1989, Table 34.
For the other Asian economies Eastern Europe rather offers new
trading opportunities than a threat. The enormous demand for capital
goods required for economic reconstruction and for consumer electro-
nics cannot be met by European suppliers alone, Asian NIEs and Near
NIEs can successfully compete for a share in this emerging market.
Likewise, they will face new export chances to the EC when output
growth accelerates import demand for intermediate products and con-
sumer goods.
Concerning privated capital flows, South Asia was not a pre-
ferred location for foreign investors in the 1980s (Table 5) and,
hence, the changes in Eastern Europe will hardly effect the attrac-
tiveness of the region for FDI. Obstaclesd to FDI continue to stem
from overregulation; e.g. they are rather internal than external in
nature. The key question is whether the other developing Asian eco-
nomies which used to absorb increasing amounts of FDI will be able
to defend their position in the 1990s. Eastern Europe could be at-
tractive for foreign investors both to gain shares in the growing
local markets and to benefit from cost advantages, e.g. due to low
labour costs. In both respects, East and Southeast Asian economies23
appear to enter well prepared into the international competition for
risk capital. Multinational enterprises will hardly adopt a strategy
of shifting investment away from this region because such a strategy
would endanger their chances in the rapidly growing Asian markets.
Indications are quite to the contrary; especially European firms
will have to strengthen their engagement in Asia-Pacific economies
to get a better foothold in this growth pole of the world economy
where they have traditionally been underrepresented [Hiemenz, Lang-
hammer, et al., 1987]. Investment flow data of the 19080s for Ger-
many confirm this emerging trend towards Asia; total German FDI in
East and Southeast Asia increased by 11.2 per cent compared to 5.7
per cent in Latinamerica, the traditional target of German FDI
[Agarwal/Gubitz/Nunnenkamp, 1991].
The second strategic aspect, i.e. cost reduction through glo-
balisation or international networking, can also not erode the
attractiveness of the Far Eastern economies for FDI. A globalisation
of production requires good transportation facilities and easy ac-
cess to international communication networks. Both conditions will
not be met by Eastern European economies for years to come. My con-
clusion on FDI flows in the 1990s is, therefore, twofold. First, the
EC will continue to be a preferred location for FDI due to the 1992
project and as an export platform to Eastern Europe. The recent
rapid increase of FDI in Germany seems to provide an early indica-
tion of this trend. FDI in Germany amounted to DM 6.1 billion in
1989 while it had ranged between 2 and DM 4 billion in the two pre-
ceding decades [Happ, 1990]. Additional investment in the EC will
rather go at the expense of the US and other industrialised coun-
tries as well as Latinamerica than at the expense of the Asia-
Pacific region. And secondly, new investment in Eastern Europe will
primarily go at the expense of the EC periphery since Eastern Europe
offers similar cost advantages in terms of low labour costs in addi-
tion to the presence on the newly merging markets. This shift will
be reinforced by rising labour costs in the EC periphery as a result
of 'social harmonisation' as was mentioned above (pp. 11-12).24
5. Summary and Conclusions
The preceding analysis suggest that intensified economic co-
operation with Europe and in particular the EC can make an important
contribution to continued economic prosperity of Asia Pacific eco-
nomies if emerging opportunities for trade and investment are vigo-
rously exploited. A still relatively open market for imports of
manufactures, the appreciation of European currencies and relatively
high income growth will make the EC a promising export destination
for Asia-Pacific economies in the 1990s. The still low shares of
these economies in EC imports and apparent consumption of manufac-
tures may partly be explained by distance and selective protectio-
nism, but they are also resulting from a lack of export push towards
Europe. The overvaluation of the US currency and the investment of
Japanese trade surpluses in near-by Asia have promoted Pacific Rim
trade expansion at the expense of trade with other regions of the
world, in particular Europe. To change this pattern and to exploit
trading opportunities in Europe, East Asian NIEs and Near NIEs will
have to diversify their export composition further in the direction
of inter-industry trade with capital goods that is less vulnerable
to protectionistic intervention; and South Asia will also have to
remove domestic policy-obstacles to exports and FDI. Furthermore,
analysis clearly indicates that FDI is an engine of trade [e.g.
Hiemenz, Langhammer et al., 1987, Chapter IV]. Asia-Pacific eco-
nomies would, thus, be well advised to complement their export ac-
tivities by FDI in Europe, a proposition which gains in importance
in light of the envisaged European Single Market.
Protectionist pressures will of course not be dissipated in the
1990s; they may even increase in some areas considered as important
for future growth (aircraft, chips). Yet, the focus of protectionism
in Europe (and the US) is on specific sectors where adjustment was
delayed (agriculture, some steel products, textiles and clothing,
cars, and some electronic products) and against specific suppliers,
i.e. mainly Japan and the NIEs as far as manufactures are concerned.
For all other products and countries market access was not signifi-
cantly impeded, and even for the victims protectionist barriers were25
not high enough to prevent them from making considerable inroads
into EC markets. Furthermore, product upgrading, product differen-
tiation and foreign direct investment provide convenient avenues to
circumvent trade restrictions which all have successfully been ap-
plied in the past.
The step towards a common market in Europe essentially entails
an internal liberalisation of trade in services and the free move-
ment of factors of production which will accelerate structural
change and enhance economic growth in member countries. An addi-
tional growth of 1 percentage point per year appears to be feasible.
Given the already accomplished internal and external liberalisation
of trade in most manufactures, non-member countries including deve-
loping Asian countries stand to gain more from this process through
induced higher import demand than they are likely to lose in the
short term because of trade diversion.
The degree to which individual countries can benefit from an
improved macro-economic environment in Europe depends on their sup-
ply potential. Asian NIEs and Near NIEs are established suppliers of
up-stream manufactures and services. They are well posed to exploit
emerging opportunities. Likewise, the opening up of Eastern Europe
rather provides new chances than a threat. The enormous backlog of
demand for capital goods cannot be satisfied by other European coun-
tries alone; it will rather create chances for even more intra-
industry division of labour in production and trade of capital
goods.
South Asia has a narrow export basket containing primarily raw
materials and MFA products. The impact of the Single European Market
on this region will remain negligible, in particular since MFA
quotas were fully exhausted in the 1980s and export expansion in
these product categories entirely depends on the uncertain outcome
of the Uruguay Round. Concerning Eastern Europe, the likely break
down of CMEA trade poses serious difficulties for South Asia. There-
fore, a diversification of exports and an improved competitiveness
of South Asian suppliers are important tasks for the governments in26
the region if the recent economic progress is to be maintained in
the 1990s. In this respect, it would also be helpful to improve the
investment climate for foreign investors, especially from Europe,
which view South Asia as a potentially attractive location because
of the large internal markets. More FDI may also be needed because
foreign aid will be less easily available in the 1990s as a result
of the large capital requirements for economic reconstruction in
Eastern Europe.
Eastern Europe can, however, not be expected to erode the in-
ternational competitiveness of Asia-Pacific economies for risk capi-
tal. Entirely inadequate infrastructural facilities, institutional-
bottlenecks and severe economic policy distortions reduce the ab-
sorptive capacity of Eastern European economies substantially while
they increase the attractiveness of the EC as an export platform to
the East. Yet, new FDI in the EC or in Eastern Europe will hardly
diminish the supply of investment to the Asia-Pacific region. Fast
growing markets and cost advantages will support a continued glo-
balisation of production and make the region a prime for foreign
investors, including European firms which finally seem to realise
that their lacking engagement in Asia is threatning their own inter-
national competitiveness in the long run.
Concerning East Asian NIEs, they could further improve their
stance in international capital markets if they would decide to
graduate themselves from the developing country status rather than
to wait to be graduated by others. Self-imposed economic disciplin
in adherence with GATT, IMF and, possibly, OECD rules of conduct
would make the NIEs an even more reliable partner of industrialised
countries. Such a step would also provide a further demonstration of
the remarkable progress the NIEs have achieved over a relatively
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NOTE: Manufactures = SITC 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 without 67 • 61: EC-12 = Jelgiui, Luxeibourg. Deniark, France, PEG, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; CHEA = USSR, GDR, Poland. CSP8, Buagary. loiania, Bulgaria.
EFTA = Austria, Finland, Iceland,
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade by Comodities, Series C, Paris, various issues. - EUIOSTAT, SITC Aujenhandelsstatistik, lander Karen, Microfiche SCE-2311. - OECD, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade,
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